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MAPPING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER ON THE
COLORADO RIVER
BY BRET C. BIRDSONGt
Colorado River systems-both ecological and legal-are facing a
coming crisis. The river snakes its way from the Rocky Mountain
crest to the Gulf of California, draining 245,000 square miles
encompassing parts of seven of the United States ("U.S.") and two
Mexican states. The river and its tributaries provide drinking water
for growing population of thirty million in an even larger area
because some of its water is diverted to serve out-of-basin demands in
both the U.S. and Mexico.' Aside from bringing life-sustaining water
to people for personal use, it provides irrigation water for some of the
most valuable agricultural lands in the world. Dams on the river
system generate enough power to supply the partial needs of some
nine to twelve million people.2 Quite simply, the Colorado River is
the lifeline of the region, both literally and economically.
It is increasingly clear that the Colorado River is not likely to
sustainably provide enough water to satisfy all of the uses demanded
of it under the legal regime currently allocating its water. Already, its
natural systems have been severely degraded by the manipulation of
t The author is a Professor of Law at William S. Boyd School of Law University of Nevada,
Las Vegas.
1. Transfers of water to other watersheds extend from the headwaters of the Colorado
nearly to its mouth in Mexico. At the top of the basin, water is diverted across the continental
divide in Colorado to serve users in Denver, Fort Collins, and elsewhere along the eastern
front of the Rocky Mountains. Further downstream, additional water is moved out of the basin
to serve Salt Lake City and central Utah, Albuquerque and other parts of New Mexico along
the Rio Grande, southern California population centers from Ventura to San Diego, productive
California agricultural regions, including the Imperial Valley, and the Mexican cities Tijuana
and Mexicali and proximate agricultural lands. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENvTL. IMPACT STATEMENT - COLO. RIVER INTERIM
GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE
POWELL AND LAKE MEAN, ES - 4 (2007) [hereinafter FEIS-INTERIM GUIDELINES].
2. The Colo. River power plants generate 12,197,000,000 kilowatt hours (kWh) of
electricity annually. COLO. RIVER WATER USERS ASS'N, http://www.crwua.org/Colorado
River/RiverUses/Power.aspx (last visited May 9, 2011).
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water by an extensive network of dams and diversions.3 Research in
recent years has demonstrated that the river historically has produced
considerably less water than is presently allocated under the "Law of
the River," including, most notably, the Colorado River Compact of
1922 and the 1944 treaty between the U.S. and Mexico. 4  Well-
founded predictions of the impacts of climate change on the Colorado
River basin draw an even gloomier picture. The predictions suggest
that average flows on the river will continue to decline even as
droughts become more frequent, and that declines in runoff will result
in amplified reduction of water stored in dams on the system.5 At the
same time, a growing population will likely demand more water from
the over allocated system. 6  All this leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the Colorado River's water budget is broken.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the allocation of water in
the Colorado River basin from a human rights perspective and to
assess the human rights implications of the most significant fault lines
in the coming crisis. Just as the basin-wide conditions on the
Colorado River are evolving and the Law of the River is evolving in
reaction, so is the notion of a human right to water in international
human rights law. This paper attempts to take stock of where these
two issues might intersect. To do this, Part I will provide a summary
overview of the Law of the River, a complex and evolving set of legal
rules derived from interstate compacts, Supreme Court decrees,
administrative decisions, and other sources. This overview will show
that a legal system that was based on overly optimistic understandings
about the availability of water continues to bend, and may eventually
break, as climate change lays bare the mistaken assumptions of its
3. See generally ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLO. RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A
TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY (2007).
4. Stream gauge data that served as the basis for the American states'1922 river water
allocation reflected one of the wettest periods of the twentieth century. NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, COLO. RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 1 [hereinafter COLORADO.
RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT]. Historical tree ring records over the past several
hundred years indicate that the river has been subject to long periods of drought and that the
long term average flow of the river is less than the amount of consumptive use presently
allocated. Id. at 110.
5. See, e.g., RETHINKING THE FUTURE OF THE COLORADO RIVER: DRAFT INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, app. B at 70-73 (2010)
[hereinafter RETHINKING THE FUTURE OF THE COLORADO RIVER] (summarizing recent
research on the effects of climate change).
6. Id. at 59-60.
7. Id. at 3.
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foundation. Part II will then identify four fissures already roiling the
Law of the River and discuss the issues they present relating to the
human right to water.
I. THE LAW OF THE RIVER
The allocation of water in the Colorado River basin is governed
by a unique and complex legal regime. Like many legal regimes
governing the allocation of natural resources, the Law of the River, as
it is known, arose over the past century in response to various crises
and developments that each posed some new challenge to individuals
and states whose future depended on water from the river. The
predictable result is a legal regime that is at once layered with
complexity, as reflective as it is determinative of power, and infused
with historical concern for vested rights. To date it has been resilient,
resisting change yet somehow adapting just enough to prevent utter
collapse under the strain of ever more powerful challenges.
A. The Colorado River Compact
The Colorado River Compact 8 and its implementing legislation
9
form the backbone of the Law of the River. The Compact, which was
negotiated among the seven U.S. states in 1922, divides the river into
Upper and Lower Basins and allocates to each 7.5 million acre-feet
(m.a.f.) consumptive use per year in perpetuity. 10 The Compact
effectuates the allocation by requiring the Upper Basin to let flow to
the lower basin an average of 7.5 m.a.f. per year at Lee Ferry,
Arizona, a spot just upstream of the Grand Canyon that is the
arbitrary dividing line between the basins. I' The Lower Basin is
allocated an additional one m.a.f. per year, but there is no requirement
for the Upper Basin states to deliver water in excess of the 7.5 m.a.f.
per year average.' 2 Although the U.S. had not yet recognized any
legal obligation to deliver water to Mexico, the Colorado River basin
8. Colo. River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
9. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (partially
codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617(t) (1994)).
10. Colo. River Compact, art. 11(c), (d), (f), (g), and art. 111(a). The Upper Basin states
are Colo., Utah, Wyo. and N.M. (though a small portion of its allocation drains into the Lower
Basin). The Lower Basin states are Cal., Nev., and Ariz. (though a small portion of the state
lies in the Upper Basin).
11. Id. at art. I1I(d).
12. Id. at art. 111(b).
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states recognized that Mexico would likely have some entitlement.
The states agreed that any Mexican share that could not be satisfied
by waters in surplus of those allocated under the Compact would be
satisfied by equal reductions in the Upper and Lower Basin
allocations. 13
The Compact does not specifically allocate water among the
individual states, focusing solely on dividing water between the
Upper and Lower Basins. Congress effectively allocated water
among the Lower Basin states by means of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928, which conditionally approved the Compact,
authorized the construction of Boulder Dam, and empowered the
Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts for the delivery if its
impounded water. The Supreme Court later held, in Arizona v.
California,14 that California was entitled to 4.4 m.a.f., Arizona 2.8
m.a.f., and Nevada 300,000 acre-feet of water annually, with
California also having an entitlement to half of any water in excess of
7.5 m.a.f. in the Colorado at Lee Ferry.' 5 The Upper Basin states
entered into a separate compact in 1948, allocating approximately 3.9
m.a.f. to Colorado, one m.a.f. to Wyoming, 1.7 m.a.f. to Utah, and
850,000 acre-feet to New Mexico, as well as 50,000 acre feet to
Arizona. 
16
The Colorado River Compact was the direct result of the
Supreme Court's announcement in 1922 that it would apply the
principles of prior appropriation to the equitable apportionment of
water among Western states. 17 Along the Colorado River, the biggest
early users of water were at the bottom of the basin. 18 California
farmers in the Imperial Valley had been irrigating with Colorado
River water, which was delivered through a canal that diverted river
water in California but dipped into Mexico before delivery to the
farmers. When the farmers proposed an "all-American" canal and
sought federal funds to build itm along with Boulder Dam and its
massive reservoir, sparsely developed Upper Basin states balked.
13. Id. at art. 111(c).
14. 373 U.S. 546, 579 (1963).
15. Id. at 565, 584.
16. Upper Colo. River Basin Compact, art. 111(a), 47 Stat 34, 35 (1949). Except for
Arizona's allocation, the compact expressed these allocations as percentages of available
water.
17. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
18. NoRRis HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A
HISTORY, 212-13 (rev. ed. 2001).
[48:117
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Such a canal would likely enable even greater water use in California,
which under the rule of "first in time, first in right," would potentially
foreclose future water development upstream. The Compact, with its
ostensible reservation of then (and still) unused water for the benefit
of Upper Basin states, was the price of early 2 0 th century development
in California.
B. Other Statutes and Administrative Mechanisms
The allocations made by the Colorado River Compact, of course,
are made only on paper. The Compact does not put water in people's
faucets or farmers' fields. Indeed there are few fields or faucets
geographically proximate to the Colorado River, which runs mostly
through remote desert areas. Making use of Colorado River water, as
with many rivers in the west, requires infrastructure-dams, reservoirs,
canals, hydroelectric facilities, and pipelines. The law authorizing
and governing the operation of this infrastructure constitutes much of
the "Law of the River."
Understanding the pervasiveness of the law of administration of
the Colorado River requires an overview of the architecture along the
river. So extensive an architecture is it that Philip Fradkin famously
concluded the Colorado is "a river no more, '' 19 but rather an
extensively managed system of built and natural conveyance
channels. The twin centerpieces of that architecture are Glen Canyon
Dam/Lake Powell, located at the bottom of the Upper Basin, and
Boulder Dam (now Hoover Dam)/Lake Mead (at the top of the Lower
Basin), with a combined storage capacity of more than fifty m.a.f.
Hoover Dam, authorized by the Boulder Canyon Project Act, by
which Congress also endorsed the Colorado River Compact, enables
the storage and delivery of water to users in the Lower Basin. Water
flowing from the Upper Basin is stored first in Lake Mead before it is
delivered to users in Nevada (primarily by pipelines), Arizona
(primarily through the Central Arizona Project), and California
(chiefly by means of the Colorado River aqueduct and All-American
Canal). Glen Canyon Dam, authorized in 1956 by the Colorado River
Storage Project Act, sits just fifteen miles upriver of Lee Ferry. Its
chief function, as a matter of plumbing, is to store water to allow the
Upper Basin to meet its Compact delivery obligations to the Lower
19. Philip L. Fradkin, A RIVER NO MORE: THE COLO. RIVER AND THE WEST (1996).
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Basin without having to curtail Upper Basin uses during dry spells.20
There are other facilities along the main stem of the Colorado River in
both the Upper and Lower Basins, but none are as essential to the
"Law of the River" as Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams.21
The myriad legal rules regarding the operation of Glen Canyon,
Hoover, and other dams on the Colorado River add considerable
complexity to the skeletal scheme of the Compact. First, as discussed
above, Congress's direction to the Secretary of the Interior to enter
into water delivery contracts with Lower Basin users for water stored
in Lake Mead served as the basis for the Supreme Court's
determination of Lower Basin states' shares of the river. Second, the
Secretary of the Interior and the federal Bureau of Reclamation
operate the dams on the Colorado River. Various statutes direct the
Secretary to manage the dams in certain ways, including to provide
for the "greatest practicable amount of power that can be sold at firm
power and energy rates," 22 and "to protect, mitigate adverse impacts
to, and improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park
and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established," 23 all
while complying with Compact, treaty and other statutory obligations.
At the direction of Congress, the Secretary has also developed long
term operating criteria for the dams on the Colorado.24 These criteria
call, importantly, for an annual release from Glen Canyon Dam of
8.23 m.a.f. and for the maintenance of roughly equal storage water in
Lake Powell and Lake Mead when storage of additional water in Lake
Powell is not needed to ensure required Upper Basin deliveries for
Lower Basin and Mexican uses.25
20. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR COLO. RIVER
RESERVOIR, 9-11 (2009). Colorado River flows in the historical record fluctuate from as low
as 4.4 m.a.f. to twenty four m.a.f. Storage is necessary to ensure that the Upper Basin is able
to deliver 7.5 m.a.f. plus half of the 1.5 m.a.f, obligated to Mexico (see infra) at Lee's Ferry on
an annual basis.
21. Id. In the Upper Basin, additional upstream storage is provided by numerous smaller
dams, including the Fontenelle and Flaming Gorge Dams on the Green River and Navajo Dam
on the San Juan River in New Mexico. Other upstream reservoirs serve as the point of
diversion for out-of-basin transfers of water. Below Hoover Dam, in the Lower Basin, Davis
and Parker Dams provide additional storage.
22. 43 U.S.C. § 620(f).
23. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No 102-575, § 1805, 106 Stat. 4600
(1992).
24. See Colo. River Basin Project Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-537, § 1004, 82 Stat. 886
(1968), codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556.
25. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Criteria For Coordinated Long-Range Operation
of Colo. River Reservoirs Pursuant To The Colo. River Basin Project Act of Sept. 30, 1968
[48:117
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Even with the numerous statutory mandates - or perhaps because
of them - much of the operation of the Colorado River facilities falls
to the discretion of the Secretary or the Bureau of Reclamation. Of
course, their discretionary decisions are subject to both the National
Environmental Policy Act 26 and the Endangered Species Act,27 which
impose both procedural and substantive limitations on the
management of the river. Not only must the Bureau of Reclamation
evaluate the environmental impacts of its river operations and consult
with the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding threatened and
endangered species, but it must also constrain its operations to avoid
"jeopardiz[ing] the continued existence" of any such species.28 Not
surprisingly, given the extent of human interference with the natural
systems of the Colorado River Basin, significant endangered species
issues confront the Lower Basin, the boundary between the Lower
and Upper Basins, and the Upper Basin.
C. Side Agreements by the States
The terse Colorado River Compact and the extensive federally
administered architecture of the river still leave some important
allocation issues unresolved on the U.S. side of the border. Some of
these gaps have been addressed by agreements between the basin
states. Chief among these is the compact among the Upper Basin
states allocating among them water that is not guaranteed to the
Lower Basin by the 1922 Compact.29 More recently, however, as
water development has increased in the Upper Basin, Nevada, and
Arizona, the basin states have entered into several side-agreements
that have important implications for the future of the river.
30
Functionally, these agreements are adopted by the Secretary in the
exercise of his discretion to manage the storage facilities on the river.
(P.L. 90-537), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf. The 8.23
m.a.f. amount constitutes the delivery obligations to the Lower Basin under the Compact (7.5
m.a.f.), plus the delivery obligations for the Upper Basin share of Mexico's water guaranteed
its 1944 treaty with the U.S. (0.75 m.a.f.), less the inflow of the Paria River which enters the
Colorado River in the Upper Basin below Glen Canyon Dam (200,000 acre-feet). The long-
range operating criteria call for water to be released to equalize storage in Lake Powell and
Lake Mead only when the level of Lake Powell exceeded 3630 feet.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
28. Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
29. Upper Colo. River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
30. These agreements are encompassed within discretionary Secretarial actions rather
than entered into as interstate compacts.
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The first agreement, known as the Interim Surplus Guidelines, 3'
addressed a situation that now seems unlikely to occur but that
highlights an important historical fact. That fact is California,
although allocated only 4.4 m.a.f. under the Law of the River, had for
many years been using about twenty percent more than that amount.
This had been possible because the Decree in Arizona v. California
permits the Secretary to redirect to another state water that a Lower
Basin state has been allocated but does not use.32  Until the last
decade, Arizona and Nevada used less than their allocated shares,
benefiting California, to which unused water was redirected. As
Nevada reached and Arizona neared full use of their allocated shares,
it became clear that California's use of more than 4.4 m.a.f, would
have to come from water in surplus of the Lower Basin's 7.5 m.a.f.
and Mexico's 1.5 m.a.f. allocations. By the surplus criteria
agreement, California users sought to enhance the predictability of
whether water would be available to them for particular uses while
California weaned itself from reliance on water in excess of its 4.4
m.a.f. share. The surplus guidelines essentially tied the determination
of whether surplus water would be available to Lake Mead levels, and
it conditioned the redirection of surplus water to California on that
state's implementation of specific measures to limit its reliance on
Colorado River water to 4.4 m.a.f.3
3
The grips of the present deep drought soon led the basin states to
confront the ambiguities in the Law of the River respecting shortages,
resulting in an agreement known as the Interim Shortage Guidelines.
34
The Interim Shortage Guidelines do three important things. First, it
provides a framework for allocating the burden of any shortages that
might occur before 2026. Second, it adjusts the rules regarding
"equalization" of Lake Powell and Lake Mead to provide additional
31. Colo. River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001).
32. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 156 (2006).
33. For both human and natural reasons, the Interim Surplus Guidelines were short-lived
in its original form. In 2002, the first year after adopting the guidelines, California failed to
meet its benchmark toward reducing its use to 4.4 m.a.f., leading the Secretary to suspend
them. She later reinstated them, but 2002 was the last year that water levels in Lake Mead
permitted any surplus determination. See Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to
Colorado River Water Shortages: The Basin States' Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964,
974 (2008).
34. Wash. Dep't of Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for
Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead
(Dec. 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/Recordof
Decision.pdf.
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security that Upper Basin users will not be shut off in order to provide
water to the Lower Basin or to Mexico under the Compact or the
Treaty. Third, the Interim Shortage Guidelines adjust the Law of the
River to provide incentives for users to maximize water available to
the system by augmentation or extraordinary conservation measures.
These incentives operate by permitting water users to capture the
benefit from "intentionally created surplus" (ICS), water that, without
the extraordinary measures, would be lost to the system.35 Rather
than such surplus water being apportioned under the decree in
Arizona v. California, the water user who creates ICS is entitled to 95
percent of the additional system water. The result is to powerfully
incentivize conservation and other measures that prevent "waste."
In addition to the Interim Guidelines, there are several other side
agreements, mostly directed toward conservation and water banking
to alleviate the impacts as Arizona achieves full use of its share. The
ICS regime in the Interim Shortage Guidelines, for example, is
predicated on agreements by the Lower Basin states to waive
enforcement of its rights under the Arizona v. California decree.
Similarly, Nevada and Arizona have agreed to a water banking
arrangement in which Nevada and Arizona are storing presently
unused portions of their joint 2.8 m.a.f. share in groundwater basins.
In the future, Nevada will be permitted to divert extra water from
Lake Mead while Arizona meets its growing demand from stored
water.36
D. Mexico
The Colorado River Compact envisioned that the U.S., "as a
matter of international comity," might later guarantee Mexico a share
of Colorado River water. 3 It provided that water for any Mexican
share would be supplied first from any surplus water not allocated to
the U.S. basin states and, if the flows were insufficient, equally from
35. Under the decree in Arizona v. California, any water in the main stem of the
Colorado River or its storage facilities was subject to apportionment under the decree. If
Nevada had paid farmers to fallow land, resulting in less consumption and thus more water to
enter Lake Mead, it would have benefited only a small amount, since California is entitled to
half the water in excess of 7.5 m.a.f and Arizona and Nevada share the other half. See, Grant,
supra note 33 at 976-78.
36. Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of
Permanence Becomes the Vice ofInflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 105, 119 n. 97 (2003).
37. Colo. River Compact, supra note 8, at art. Ill(c).
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the Upper and Lower Basin apportionments. 38 Although the states
had discussed allocating Mexico a share of water, they had been
urged by the State Department not to do so, on the grounds that the
U.S. had a legal right to use the entire flow of the river within its
boundaries.
39
In 1944, the U.S. and Mexico entered into a treaty guaranteeing
the delivery of 1.5 m.a.f. per year at the border between the
countries.40 The U.S. agreed to "undertake" to provide an additional
200,000 acre-feet of water if surplus flows allowed the satisfaction of
uses in the U.S., but the determination of any such surplus was left to
the U.S.41 In regard to potential shortages, the treaty is ambiguous. It
provides for a reduction in the Mexican share in the event of an
"extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in
the United States," that makes it "difficult" for the U.S. to supply
Mexico's 1.5 m.a.f. share.42 Any reduction in Mexico's share is
required to be "in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the
United States are reduced.A3  The treaty does not define
"extraordinary drought," "serious accident," or "difficult[y]," and it
does not suggest any method of determining the proportionality of
reductions in the U.S. or Mexico.44
A number of physical attributes of the Colorado River system
offer important context. First, there are no significant storage
facilities, nor the potential for any, within Mexico. As a result, water
delivered to Mexico must be used upon delivery, or it will be lost to
its intended uses.45 To reduce these losses, the U.S. and Mexico
coordinate deliveries on an annual and weekly basis through the
International Boundary and Water Commission.46 The lack of storage
38. Id.
39. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR. DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MExICO 51 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1966).
40. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art. 10(a), Feb.
3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty with Mexico"].
41. Id. at art. I0(b).
42. Id. at art. 10.
43. Id.
44. See generally Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River: The
Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367, 411-15 (1967).
45. Water released to but not diverted by Mexico flows to the Colorado River delta,
where it has some environmental and associated human benefits. See infra at note 108.
46. See Int'l Boundary Water Comm'n, http://www.ibwc.gov/WaterData/Colorado
/Index.html (last visited May 16, 2011).
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within Mexico increases the importance of storage in the U.S.
(particularly Lake Mead) for water that might be used in Mexico.
Due largely to the extensive use of water upstream in the
Colorado River and its tributaries, water in the lower Colorado River
is highly saline and of potentially poor quality for irrigation in
Mexico, reducing crop productivity. Much of the salinity is the result
of the irrigation of saline soils throughout the watershed, but it is
exacerbated by the inflow of water from the Gila River system just
above the boundary with Mexico. The U.S. has agreed to deliver
Colorado River water to Mexico of equivalent quality as that
delivered to farmers in the Imperial Valley in California.47 To date,
the U.S. has met that obligation by a combination of two measures: a
basin-wide program that pays for farmers to implement salinity
control measures and by shunting highly saline water from the
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District through canals to
wetlands in Mexico rather than delivering it to the Colorado River.48
A third measure, operating a desalination plant to treat saline
water from the Gila River system and then discharging it into the
Colorado River, has been authorized and tested, but not yet pursued
beyond pilot runs. Operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant could
annually desalt 78,000 acre-feet of water that would be available for
delivery to Mexico. The chief beneficiaries of the plant's operation
would be Lower Basin water users, including Las Vegas, who would
be able to use water that otherwise must be released from Lake Mead
to meet the U.S.' obligation to Mexico. But the likely loser would be
the Santa Clara wetland in Mexico, one of the Colorado River delta's
largest remaining wetlands that is currently fed primarily from saline
water shunted away from the delivery point to Mexico.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER FOR FOUR
COLORADO RIVER FAULT LINES
A. The Emergent Human Right to Water
The primary focus of human rights law generally is to protect
citizens from violations of their basic rights by their own
47. Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n, Minute 242, Aug. 30, 1973, available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html.
48. To implement Minute 242, Congress enacted the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Act of 1974, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1571.
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governments.49 Similarly, human rights law may impose affirmative
obligations on governments to protect or otherwise provide for the
fulfillment of their citizens' human rights. In most instances, those
obligations are only owed to their own citizens, not to citizens of
other states.50 In its most basic form, then, human rights law offers
citizens a bulwark against repression by their own governments and a
basis for demanding that their own governments take measures to
secure the basic right. Because of the transitory nature of water and
its essentiality to human life; however, it has been suggested that the
human right to water might impose obligations on upstream countries
to provide for (or at least not impede) the realization of the right by
citizens of downstream countries.
1. The Human Right to Water and the Focus on Basic Needs
and Sanitation
The notion of water as a human right, as it has been recognized
thus far, is centered on the most basic human needs regarding water -
the need for safe drinking water and water for basic sanitation. As
recently declared by the United Nations General Assembly, "the right
to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation [is] a basic human
right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human
rights. 52  Similarly, General Comment 15 of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Comment 15"), which, to
date, provides the fullest description of the right, its bases, and its
implications for governance, states: "[t]he human right to water
entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible
and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. 53
This narrow focus on drinking water and sanitation has
important implications for how it might impact the allocation of water
from a highly developed river system in a wealthy industrialized
nation like the U.S., or even a developing nation like Mexico. First,
the narrow focus, not surprisingly, shrinks the size of the "problem."
49. John Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 82, 82 (Mark Gibley and Sigrun Skogly, eds., 2010).
50. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INTL. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1992-1993).
51. Seeid. at 19-20.
52. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, Draft Resolution, U.N. GAOR,
A/64/L.63/Rev. 1, (July 26, 2010) (emphasis added).
53. Committee on Economic Social And Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Gen. Comment
No. 15, 2 (Nov. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Comment 15].
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To be sure, there are pockets within the U.S. where there is still no
access to basic water necessary for personal and domestic use.54 As
discussed below, one of these pockets is in Indian country along the
Colorado River.55 But this number reflects a small proportion of the
overall population of the Colorado River Basin.
Second, because the amount of water necessary to fulfill basic
drinking water and sanitation needs is small, it would appear that
most vital human needs could be fairly easily met without major
disruption of existing allocations. After all, nearly eighty percent of
Colorado River water in both the Upper and Lower Basins is put to
agricultural use, and much of this use is inefficient, because of either
the marginal quality of the lands to which it is applied or the use of
inefficient methods of conveyance or irrigation. This suggests that, to
the extent that an over appropriated river is a problem, it should be a
problem susceptible to a solution in which water saved by improving
the efficiency of agricultural water use is redirected to serve vital
human needs.56
2. Alternative Views of a Human Right to Water
Despite the narrow thrust of the human right to water to provide
basic drinking water and sanitation, there has been some recognition
that the human ight to water might extend beyond sanitation. Both
scholars and the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ground the emergent human right to water in an array of other
recognized human rights. These include the right to life, the right to
health, the right to housing, and the right to food.5 7 Comment 15, for
54. A study by the Rural Community Assistance Project found that 1.7 million people in
the U.S. lived in housing units that lacked full plumbing facilities. RURAL COMMUNITY
ASSISTANCE PARTNERSHIP, STILL LIVING WITHOUT THE BASICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
ANALYZING THE AVAILABILITY OF WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 12-13 (2009).
55. See, infra p. 15. The Rural Community Assistance Project estimates that about
8,600 homes lack full plumbing in northeastern Arizona, where many Navajo, Hopi and
Apache people live. Supra note 65.
56. The ICS program in the Interim Guidelines is an example of a legal mechanism
through which this can be accomplished. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines,
supra note 31.
57. Comment 15, supra note 53, at 3; SALMAN M.A. SALMAN AND SIOBHAN
MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS
56-57 (2004); Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, PACIFIC INSTITUTE, 6 (July 9, 1999),
http://www.pacinst.org/reports/basicwater-needs/human-right to-water.pdf ; Stephen C.
McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INTL.
ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 1 (1992-1993).
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example, notes that "the importance of ensuring sustainable access to
water resources for agriculture to realize the right to adequate food"
and calls upon nations to "ensure that there is adequate access to
water for subsistence farming and for securing the livelihoods of
indigenous peoples."'5 8
A human right to water that encompassed the right to water for
food production would not necessarily have significant implications
for the allocation of Colorado River water. Irrigation water from
Colorado River is an essential input for farms that produce a high
proportion of the nation's winter produce. But the farms served by
Colorado River water are not subsistence farms; rather, at least within
the U.S., they are generally large operations that produce food not for
the subsistence of the farmers or even local populations but for the
national market. A human right to water based on a right to adequate
food would seem too constrained to ensure water for the production
of commodity produce.
B. Fault Lines on the Colorado River from a Human Rights
Perspective
1. Lower Basin Foreclosure of Upper Basin Development
Under the Law of the River, the Upper Basin within the U.S.
bears the primary risk of shortage. Specifically, should conditions on
the river decline to the point that the natural flow and storage in the
Upper Basin reservoirs are insufficient to supply the required
deliveries to the Lower Basin and to Mexico in a given year, the
Upper Basin would have to forgo using its apportioned share in order
to meet delivery obligations at Lee Ferry. This is the result of the
Compact's expression of the allocation in terms of the Upper Basin's
obligation to deliver water to the Lower Basin and for Mexico. 59 In
58. Comment 15, supra note 53, at 7.
59. Upper Basin states could argue that the Compact bars them only from depleting the
river's flow or otherwise withholding water from the Lower Basin, rather than requiring a
delivery of 7.5 m.a.f. even in the event of natural reduction in the flow. See, e.g., RETHINKING
THE FUTURE OF THE COLORADO RIVER, supra note 5, at 43 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.rlch.org/archive/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/CRGI-Interim-Report.pdf (citing E.
Kuhn, The Colorado River: The Story of a Quest for Certainty on a Diminishing River
(Roundtable Edition)). Most scholars disagree, viewing the operation of the Compact to, in
fact, impose a delivery obligation of an average 7.5 m.a.f plus one half of Mexico's 1.5 m.a.f.
share. Id. (citing David Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing federal authority as an
incentive to create a new institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 573 (1997) and D. Wegner,
Environmental Restoration: Challenges for the New Millennium: Looking Towards the Future:
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essence, this gives all Lower Basin uses priority over Upper Basin
uses developed after the Compact. 60  One recent policy review
concludes that "it is now possible to foresee a situation in which
Upper Basin users could be curtailed to the point of ... those uses
already in existence when the Compact was signed.'
It is difficult, maybe even impossible, to predict the impacts on
Upper Basin water deliveries if such a curtailment occurs,6 2 but it
seems plausible that water agencies serving residential customers in
the Upper Basin could be forced to seek water elsewhere. This could
implicate the human right to water, especially if the right is expressed
more broadly than addressing only clean drinking water and
sanitation, by depriving local water agencies and municipalities the
ability to provide basic water services to their populations. Of course,
as the reality of a declining river flow eroded optimism that water
utilities would be able to continue to supply their customers, strong
political and economic incentives would likely spur them to develop
alternative supplies, perhaps from groundwater or from transfers of
protected preexisting water rights. These incentives would be
consistent with obligations to protect the water supply imposed by the
human right to water.
Another possibility, though it seems remote, is that the Law of
the River, including the Compact, could be reshaped to provide for
the fulfillment of the human right to water. This might be
accomplished by adjusting the priorities of any domestic or other uses
that are necessary to provide minimum sufficient water for drinking
and sanitation to relieve them from the squeeze the Upper Basin
would suffer in the event of an extreme reduction in flows. Although
interstate water compacts are generally regarded as being permanent,
there are plausible arguments that support a state's withdrawal from a
The Time has Come to Restore Glen Canyon, 42 ARIZ. L. REv. 239 (2000); see, also, Douglas
L. Grant, Interstate Water Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence Becomes the Vice of
Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 105, 118 (2003).
60. The Compact explicitly protects preexisting uses in the Upper Basin. Colorado
River Compact of 1922, supra note 8, art. ViII ("Present perfected rights to the beneficial use
of waters of the Colorado River System are unimpaired by this compact.").
61. RETHINKING THE FUTURE, supra note 59, at 14-15. The authors of the report
suggest that such a point might be reached if the long term average flow of the river declines
below 10.5 m.a.f. Id. at 16.
62. The U.S. Dep't of the Interior recently launched a basin wide review of existing and
projected water uses. The Colorado River Water Supply & Demand Study is due to be
completed by the end of 2011. See http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy.html.
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compact when faced with dire consequences63 such as inability under
the compact to provide its citizens the minimum amount of water
required by human rights law. The threat of withdrawal, or even
litigation over the ability of a state to withdraw from the Compact,
could induce the other basin states to permit a limited adjustment in
64priority.
2. Ecological Collapse
Even with flows well above the range that climate change
portends, the extensive plumbing and human interference with the
natural flow regime has wreaked havoc on the ecological systems of
the Colorado River. The fate of river dependent species up and down
the river indicates a system in ecological peril. The ecological crisis
has brought about a combination of litigation and collaboration by
stakeholders in the river, but demonstrated progress in reversing the
decline of species and restoring habitat and ecological functioning has
been spotty at best. Even if it is too soon to conclude that existing
laws are not up to the task of saving endangered Colorado River
fishes, it is still worth considering whether emergent notions of a
human right to water can provide an additional impetus for ecological
stabilization and restoration.
The extensive human manipulation of the Colorado River and its
flows is the common cause to the endangered species problems up
and down the river. There are currently major multiparty efforts
proceeding in both the Upper Basin and Lower Basin to address the
plight of endangered Colorado River native fishes.65 One of these is
the Colorado River Endangered Fishes Recovery Program, which
seeks to recover the Colorado pike minnow, the humpback chub, the
razorback sucker, and the bonytail. This program permits water users
to contribute financially to a coordinated set of recovery measures,
including native-fish stocking and controlling non-native predator
fish, to avoid having their water use blocked by "jeopardy"
determinations under the Endangered Species Act.66 In the Lower
Basin, a multi-species habitat conservation plan adopts a similar
63. Grant, supra note 33 at 990 andpassim.
64. See id. at 971.
65. Professor Robert Adler extensively evaluates the causes and responses to ecological
decline in his excellent 2007 book calling for ecological restoration of the Colorado River.
Robert W. Adler, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY (2007).
66. See id. at 121-23.
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approach to ESA compliance by allowing payments into a fund to
support habitat conservation efforts, which include both habitat
restoration and fish stocking.67 Both of these programs, in which
water users essentially make payments for permits, have been
criticized as likely being inadequate to recover the imperiled
species.68
Also instructive is the increasingly apparent inadequacy of the
current legal and cooperative regime to adequately address the decline
of the endangered humpback chub and other species of native
Colorado River fish downstream of Glen Canyon Dam. In this stretch
of the river, intractable conflicts between endangered species, water
rights, and hydroelectric power generation, combined with opaque
statutory requirements about how to address those conflicts led to
legal confusion about how to lawfully operate Glen Canyon Dam.
69
Facing a determination that the operation of Glen Canyon Dam would
jeopardize the continued existence of the humpback chub in violation
of the ESA, the Secretary of Interior created the Glen Canyon
Adaptive Management Work Group (AMWG) in 1997.70 A
multiparty stakeholder group, the AMWG's purpose is to provide
advice to the Secretary regarding the formulation and implementation
of an adaptive management program for Glen Canyon Dam in order
to assist the Secretary in meeting environmental and other obligations
under the law.7 1 The work of the AMWG includes recommending
research and monitoring plans to enhance knowledge of how the
operation the dam affects the environment in the Grand Canyon,
including the humpback chub.72 Although the AMWG has overseen
the experimental use of alternative flow regimes, the dam still
operates under the same default fluctuating flow regime that the Fish
and Wildlife Service determined in 1994 was jeopardizing the
67. Id. at 187.
68. Id. at 188 ("[T]he MSCP is really just a program to mitigate the impacts of
incremental harm caused by proposed future changes in river operations .... but "does not
constitute comprehensive environmental restoration."); Id. at 123 ("population trends for the
four listed species [in the Upper Basin] are not encouraging.").
69. Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning about Ecosystem
Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L. J. 942, 947-49 (2008).
70. Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation
of Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L. J. 896, 917-921 (2008).
71. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
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humpback chub.73 And the ecological resources of the river remain in
jeopardy, despite two recent lawsuits to force the Bureau of
Reclamation to comply with its obligations under the ESA.7 4
Overall, the ability of the existing legal regime to effectively
respond to the ecological collapse of Colorado River and its
dependent species is in reasonable doubt. The famously toothy ESA,
with its outright prohibition of harm and jeopardy to endangered
species, has failed to ensure any sustained recovery of imperiled
Colorado River fish despite two decades.Indeed, the Bureau of
Reclamation continues to assert that its ability to respond is severely
limited by the Law of the River, which narrows its discretion
respecting the delivery of water to the Lower Basin and to Mexico.
As with the other major fissures on the Colorado River, the problem
of ecological collapse seems likely to worsen with climate change.75
If the current legal regime seems unfit to address the threatened
ecology of the Colorado River, it is fair to ask whether some other
regime-one, say, based on a human right to water-might offer
assistance. Unfortunately for the native fish of the Colorado River, a
human right to water offers little to depend on. The problem is the
expression of the emergent human right to water in minimalist and
utilitarian terms. It is a right that is narrowly focused on human
needs, specifically clean drinking water and sanitation.76 But the
conditions that threaten the river's native fish-including the
disruption of the natural flow regime, dam blockage of fish passage,
and the deprivation of sediment necessary to their habitat-are simply
too far removed from the concerns of providing a minimal source of
clean water to be fruitfully addressed by a legal regime focused so
narrowly on the latter.
It is certainly possible to hypothesize situations in which the
ecological stability of a river system might more fully overlap with a
human right to water. There might be river systems in the world in
which preserving the ecological functioning of the river is integrally
linked with providing clean water and sanitation to people relying on
the river, such as where wetlands provide "ecosystem services" such
73. Lawrence Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho, and Todd Schenk, Collaborative
Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J.
ENVT'LL. 1,25 (2010).
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id. at 28 (citing research conducted by the University of Colorado indicating that the
Colorado River could run dry by 2057).
76. Comment 15, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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as cleansing or hydrographic benefits. But the Colorado River within
the U.S. is a river for which that connection is not easily made. There
are also likely rivers in which human subsistence is linked with non-
sanitation functions of natural systems, such as fish habitat for species
that provide food for local populations. If the human right to water
includes the right to use water to produce adequate food,7 7 and if this
right includes safeguarding the ability of ecological systems to
provide food, rather than solely for subsistence agriculture,78 then it
might reach environmental systems. But there is scant evidence that
any of the native fish species ever provided a significant food source
for humans along the Colorado River in the U.S.
79
3. Indian Water Rights
The faultline in Colorado River governance that strikes closest to
the core of a human right to water is the issue of water rights for
Native Americans. Many Native Americans living in the arid
Colorado River Basin lack access to running water in their homes,
and many of the tribes lack confirmed, quantified water rights and the
infrastructure to put water to use for agriculture and economic
development, or to deliver it to their people for basic domestic use.
This is the case even though, for more than a century, it has been clear
that the tribes own water rights.
As they do elsewhere in the West, Indian water rights pose a
significant problem for non-Indian Colorado River water users,
largely because of their early priority, uncertainty as to their quantity,
and their place in the Colorado River legal regime. Two settlements
of Navajo water rights claims in recent years-one just completed, and
another at the beginning of a long trail of approval by interested
parties-demonstrate the difficulties and trade-offs involved in
providing a basic supply of water to thousands of the region's most
disadvantaged residents. They also demonstrate the potential for a
77. Id. 2,6.
78. See id 7.
79. Lastly, some have theorized that a human right to the environment is linked to the
human right to water. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 57, at 57-58. The
very existence of a human right to the environment, however, is disputed. See id. at 58.
Notably, Comment 15 omits any reference to a human right to the environment even while
referencing rights to life, food, and housing. It seems improbable that a human right to water
derived from a human right to the environment would offer any basis for addressing the
ecological decline of the Colorado River.
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quasi-human rights approach to Indian water rights with the potential
to lead to a secure "wet" water supply for Indian people.
a) The Legal Basis for Navajo Water Rights
The Supreme Court recognized in 1908 that tribes held water
rights in lands set aside by Congress as reservations in the amount
necessary to fulfill Congress's purpose in creating the reservations,
80
and that those rights had priority as of the date of the reservation.
The place of Indian federal reserved water rights in the Colorado
River regime has been uncertain and a source of great trepidation for
non-Indian water users along the river. When the basin states forged
the Colorado River Compact, they excluded the tribes from the
negotiations and agreement. The Compact dispatched with potential
Indian water rights by vaguely stating: "Nothing in this Compact shall
be construed as affecting the obligations of the U.S. of America to
Indian tribes."
81
More than half a century after the Compact, the Supreme Court
clarified two significant issues that potentially gave Indian water
rights in the Colorado River Basin the status of sleeping giants. In
Arizona v. Colorado,82  in which the Court recognized the
apportionment of water among the Lower Basin states, the U.S. had
asserted and sought to quantify reserved rights on behalf of five tribes
with reservations along the lower Colorado River. First, Indian water
rights to Colorado River water are charged against each state's
apportioned share.83 Giving that finding punch, the Court also
approved the Special Master's decision to quantify the tribes' rights
based on the amount of "practicably irrigable acreage" that exists on
the reservations, which had been set aside to provide Indians with
agricultural homelands.84 Quantification of water rights using the
"practicably irrigable acreage" standard, which has become the most
widely applied standard for quantifying Indian reserved rights, is a
factually-intensive but variable process, involving the assessment of
soils for arability, analysis of the engineering feasibility of delivering
irrigation water to arable lands, and consideration of economic costs
80. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
81. Colo. River Compact, art. VII (1922).
82. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
83. See id. at 601.
84. Id. at 600-601.
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and benefits of actually delivering technically deliverable water to
technically arable lands.85
The rights of the five tribes quantified in Arizona v. California
under the practicably irrigable acreage standard totaled about one
million acre feet of water diverted to be applied to about 135,000
acres of arable land, about 500,000 acre feet of which may be
consumed. 86 In the Colorado River Basin, about two dozen other
tribes likely hold federal reserved water rights that may affect the
availability of water to other users. Only some of these water rights
have been quantified or settled. Most significant among the
outstanding claims is that of the Navajo Nation, whose reservation is
the largest in the country, covering some 24,000 square miles, or
nearly ten percent of the entire Colorado River Basin. Although
counsel for the Navajo estimated in 1997 that Navajo rights could
total five m.a.f.,87 the tribe did not voluntarily assert any water rights
in court until 2003, when it sued the U.S. to enjoin its further
facilitation of water development in the Lower Basin before
quantifying and considering Navajo rights in the Colorado River.
Despite the potentially large quantity of Navajo and other Indian
reserved water rights in the Colorado River Basin, considerable
uncertainty has always characterized the extent of potential Navajo
rights. First, although the PIA standard can result in large awards of
water to Indians in arable lands close to the water source, this may not
be the case with Navajo rights. Diverting water from the Colorado
River and moving it to Navajo lands would be difficult and expensive,
even if technically feasible. A court applying the PIA standard could
find that the cost, for example, of pumping water from the canyons of
the Colorado River hundreds of feet in elevation to Navajo lands,
would diminish or negate the economic value of the water, rendering
the lands not "practicably" irrigable. Second, although the Supreme
Court accepted the special master's use of the PIA standard in
Arizona v. California as "the only feasible and fair way" to measure
the Indian reserved rights then at issue, it stopped short of mandating
85. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cosens, The Arizona Homeland Standard Measure of Indian
Water Rights, in TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND
ECONOMICS 50 (John E. Thorson, et al, eds., 2006).
86. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 596.
87. Water Education Foundation, 75th Anniversary Colorado River Compact
Symposium Proceedings 60 (1997) (remarks of Stanley Pollack, Water Rights Counsel,
Department of Justice, Navajo Nation).
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that the standard be used generally for Indian reserved rights, or even
all Indian reserved rights in the Lower Basin.
88
The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in the Gila River
adjudication, rejecting the PIA standard as the sole method of
quantifying Indian reserved rights,89 added to the uncertainty
surrounding Navajo rights. In that case, the court rejected a focus on
the agricultural potential of reservations in favor of a broader view of
reservations as permanent homelands. Under such a view, Indian
reserved rights are to be quantified for actual and proposed feasible
uses that serve the permanent homeland purpose. Although
quantification may be accomplished by developing a master land and
water use plan, as is common in Indian reserved rights settlements,
tribes may also present evidence of other water uses and needs. 90
Such evidence may address such factors, non-exclusively, as (1) the
tribe's history, (2) tribal culture, including water use, (3) the
geography, topography, natural resources of the reservation, including
groundwater availability, (4) the tribe's economic base, (5) past water
use on the reservation, and (6) the tribe's present and projected
population.
9 1
In reaching its conclusion, the Arizona court recounted several
inequities built into the PIA standard. The first inequity is that the
standard provides ample water for tribes whose reservations include
large amounts of easily irrigable land, but it ensures little, or possibly
none, for tribes who cannot show that water may be economically
developed, even for basic human uses such as drinking water and
sanitation.92 A second inequity is that it treats Indians differently than
non-Indian water users, who have long benefited from federally-
funded irrigation projects that were never subjected to the kind of
stringent cost-benefit analysis called for by PIA.93
88. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601, Special Master Tuttle, who served the Court
during the second incarnation of Arizona v. California, culminating in its decision, Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605 (1984), observed: "Although the Court did not necessarily adopt this
standard as the universal measure of Indian reserved water rights, it constitutes the law of this
casefor thefive Reservations under consideration." Elbert Tuttle, Special Master Report at 90
(1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
89. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Arizona 2001).
90. Id. at 79.
91. Id. at79-8t.
92. Id. at 78.
93. Id.
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The wet-water issue presents further difficulties for Indian water
rights. Even if tribes in the Colorado River Basin secured quantified
water rights through adjudication, the water rights are useful only if
water can actually be delivered to users on the reservation or leased to
users off the reservation. 94  As with any other water in the West,
infrastructure is needed to accomplish this, and infrastructure, even if
economically feasible, requires capital resources that tribes often do
not have. This is one reason that most tribes choose to settle rather
than litigate water rights claims; federal or other money to pay for
needed infrastructure can be made one of the terms of settlement.
b) The Recent Navajo Water Rights Settlements in the San
Juan basin and Northeastern Arizona
For much of the past decade, the Navajo Nation has been seeking
to settle its reserved rights claims in the Colorado River Basin. There
have been pressing reasons to secure an adequate supply of useable
water, including a poverty rate of more than fifty percent, a widely
dispersed population on arid lands that is expected to double by 2040,
and a lack of water infrastructure to deliver clean water to more than
forty percent of Navajo households.95 At the same time, although the
tribe's rights by law would have a priority of 1868 (the date of
establishment of the Navajo reservation), the practical ability to
realize those rights was being diminished by continued non-Indian
development, particularly in the Lower Basin, with Nevada reaching
and Arizona approaching the full use of their apportionments.
The Navajo reservation straddles the dividing line between the
Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with about half of its
territory situated in each. In part because the Law of the River
artificially treats the basins as distinct,96 and in part because tribal
water rights are subject to adjudication in state court proceedings, 97 a
94. It is the prevailing view that tribes may lease their rights to Colorado River water for
non-agriculture uses off the reservation.
95. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, NAVAJO-GALLUP WATER
SUPPLY PROJECT, PLANNING REPORT AND FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, at 11-1, 11-2
(2009) [hereinafter NG WSP EIS].
96. The Compact establishes a default rule that water must be used within the basin from
which it is diverted. Colo. River Compact, art. VIII ("All other rights to beneficial use of
waters of the Colorado River System shall be satisfied solely from the water apportioned to
that Basin in which they are situate.").
97. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (waiving federal sovereign immunity for the adjudication of
federal water rights claims in general stream adjudications in state court).
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comprehensive settlement of Navajo reserved rights presented special
problems. In 1975, New Mexico initiated a general adjudication of
all waters in the San Juan River, a major tributary of the Colorado
River along the northeastern boundary of the Navajo reservation,
leading to extended negotiations over Navajo rights in New Mexico.
As mentioned, the tribe did nothing to assert its claims to Colorado
River water in the Lower Basin until 2003.
After years of negotiation, the Navajo Nation, the U.S., and New
Mexico, along with other interested parties, reached an agreement
regarding Navajo claims to water from the San Juan River system.
The complex agreement has four main components.98 First, overall it
secures to the Navajo a right to divert about 600,000 acre-feet and to
consume about half of that. Most of this water would be used for
irrigation. Second, the federal government will pay approximately
$700 million to construct a network of pipelines to carry about 20,000
acre-feet of water to areas in the eastern area (Upper Basin) of the
Navajo reservation, the Jicarilla Apache reservation, and the city of
Gallup for municipal and industrial use. This project will carry clean
water for household use, for the first time, to thousands of Navajo and
who have relied on hauling water to their homes from distant points.
Third, the Navajo agree to subordinate their early priority to some of
the water, including the bulk of their irrigation water and all of the
Navajo-Gallup pipeline water to a date that would require them to
share in any shortages with other non-Navajo users of water stored in
Navajo Dam. The settlement became final in December 2010, after
Congress authorized and funded the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply
Project, the Interior Department decided to implement it, and the
Secretary signed the agreement.
99
The Navajo Nation has also recently approved settling its claims
to water in the main stem of the Colorado River (Lower Basin), the
Little Colorado River and groundwater within its reservation in
Arizona. The Northeastern Arizona Indian Water Rights
Settlement'00 continues the approach of the San Juan Basin settlement
98. Exec. Summary of the San Juan Basin in N.M. Navajo Water Rights Settlement
Agreement, Office of the N.M. State Eng'r, (Apr. 19, 2005) available at http://www.ose.
state.nm.us/legal-ose_proposed settlementssj.html.
99. George Hardeen, Navajo President Joe Shirley, Jr., joins Interior Secretary Ken
Salazar to sign San Juan River Water Settlement; will bring $1 billion project, NAVAJO
NATION, Dec. 26, 2010 available at http://www.navajo.org.
100. Northeastern Ariz. Indian Water Rights Settlement Agreement, Navajo Nation
Council, 2010 available at http://nnwrc.org/docs/20100716settlementagreement.pdf
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to focus on securing wet water to Navajo homes, many of which are
presently un-served. If finalized, which is contingent upon approval
by the Hopi and other entities, as well as congressional authorization
and funding, it will authorize the use of the Navajo-Gallup pipeline to
deliver about 6,400 acre feet to Navajo communities in the Lower
Basin in Arizona. Under the settlement, federal money will pay for
an additional pipeline from Lake Powell (in the Upper Basin) to carry
about 11,000 acre-feet per year to several Navajo communities and an
additional 4,000 acre-feet per year to Hopi villages. Federal dollars
will also pay for two groundwater projects to deliver nearly 10,000
additional acre-feet per year to other Navajo communities. The
agreement guarantees Navajo nearly unfettered use of groundwater
from two aquifers on the reservation, as well as difficult-to-use
unappropriated water in the Little Colorado River. Lastly, it secures
just 31,000 acre-feet per year from the main stem of the Colorado,
water that may be used, marketed or leased.
These settlements reflect a significant departure from the PIA-
based quantification methods prevalent in Indian water rights
settlements toward a quasi-human-right-to-water approach.' 0 ' They
seem fundamentally structured to ensure that a shamefully
underserved Navajo population gain actual access to clean water for
household and other uses. Together, these settlements provide for a
vast expansion of the availability of drinking water to Navajo
communities, paid for mostly by the federal government. Yet it bears
emphasis that securing that basic access to water comes at a price. In
the case of the Northeastern Arizona Indian Water Rights Settlement,
that price is the relinquishment of claims of what some had, perhaps
101. 1 use the term "quasi-human-right-to-water" because the quantity of water secured
for Navajo communities is likely more than justified by the narrowest measures of water
needed for drinking and sanitation. In a video posted on their website, the Navajo Nation
Water Rights Commission notes that the amounts are sufficient to secure 160 gallons per
person per day based on estimates of population growth to 2040. Northeastern Ariz. Indian
Water Rights Settlement, Water Infrastructure Projects (Oct. 25, 2010), http://nnwrc.org/; See
also Navajo Nation Water Rights Commission, Colo. River Basins (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYQP1JRh7gY&feature=player-embedded. Estimates the
amount of water needed to satisfy an individual's human right to water based on clean
drinking water and sanitation range from as low as 7.5 liters per day to 100 liters per day, far
lower than the 160 gallon per day figure. Amy Hardberger, Whose Job is it Anyway?:
Governmental Obligations Created by the Human Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT'L L. J. 533,
540-41 (2006). The quantity of 160 gallons per person per day was also used to estimate the
demand for water delivered to Navajo communities by the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply
Project, a figure that the City of Gallup also used in its water demand projections. NGWSP
EIS at 11-3.
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unrealistically, expected to be vast amounts of water from the
Colorado River in order to secure what might be seen as an
entitlement under basic principles of human rights.'
0 2
4. The Bottom of the Basin: Mexico 's Reliance on Colorado
River Water
The international boundary with Mexico presents a fourth
potential problem in the existing Law of the Colorado River. The
potential for drought and increasing pressures on the river raise two
issues potentially within the scope of the human right to water.
One issue, of course, is the security of Mexico's share of the
Colorado River under the current regime. The ability of the U.S. to
deprive Mexico of water, especially water promised under the 1944
treaty, would raise substantial human rights concerns. The existing
legal regime, however, minimizes (though it does not entirely
eliminate) the risk of any curtailment of the Mexican share of
Colorado River water. The 1944 treaty's "guarantee" of 1.5
Mexico's share establishes Mexico's share as first priority on the
river. '0 3 As a general matter, then, U.S. is obligated to deliver water
to Mexico even if it must curtail uses within the U.S. Yet the
ambiguous provisions leave open the possibility that the U.S. could
claim "extraordinary drought" and reduce water delivery to Mexico.
Modeling shows that this could result in significant and relatively
frequent reductions in deliveries to Mexico, depending on whether
Mexico deliveries are curtailed only when Lower Basin deliveries are
curtailed, or more frequently when Upper Basin shortages exist.
10 4
Whether such curtailments to Mexico would affect Mexico's ability
to provide clean drinking water to its people or to ensure subsistence
agriculture is not known, but such results could raise significant
concerns respecting the human right to water and the basic obligations
owed by the U.S. to its southern neighbor.1
0 5
102. A number of Navajo community groups and some Navajo lawmakers opposed the
settlement of Colorado River reserved rights. Felicia Fonseca, Navajo lawmakers approve
water rights settlement, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 5, 2010) http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
700079134/Navajo-lawmakers-approve-water-rights-settlement.html.
103. 1944 Treaty with Mexico, supra note 40, art. 10.
104. Modeling Assumptions with Regard to Future Water Deliveries to Mexico,
Sensitivity Analysis, Appendix Q to FEIS- INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 2 at Q-8 - Q-14.
105. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INTL. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17-23 (1992-1993) (arguing that an upstream
state's use of water for irrigation and power generation resulting curtailment of a downstream
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There are other issues in the border region that could also give
rise to human rights concerns. Most notable of these is the plight of
the Colorado River delta in Mexico, which has been perhaps the most
severely impacted of the ecological resources of the entire Colorado
River. Once a vast and productive network of estuarine wetlands, the
delta is a shadow of its former self. Due to water storage in the U.S.
and diversions in both the U.S. and Mexico, flowing water fails to
reach the delta in most years, and perhaps as few as 40,000 acres are
all that remain of 1.8 million acres of functioning wetlands in the
historic delta. 10 6 Here, however, unlike the Grand Canyon, indigenous
people have long relied on the delta for subsistence and commercial
fishing, as well as for a water supply. About 200 remain of the
Cucapa people, and the devastation of the delta has imperiled their
traditional food sources, livelihood and access to clean water.
10 7
This has obvious human rights implications, but they are
complicated by the limitations of human rights law, which usually
applies only to impose obligations on a government to provide for its
own people. Under the traditional construct of human rights law, in
which states owe duties to their people, Mexico would have an
obligation to provide access to water for drinking and sanitation, and
perhaps for the subsistence needs of the Cucapa and other delta
residents. Whether it can, or should be required to, meet these needs
from its small allocation of Colorado River water, however, raises
other issues. Presumably, the U.S., with its vastly larger legal claim
to the river's water and its sophisticated water storage apparatus,
would be better suited to provide water for the delta. Yet it would be
an extension of accepted human rights norms for citizens of one state
to be able to assert the human right to water to require water
deliveries from an upstream state.
Whatever the legal obligations under human rights law to
provide water for the delta and the people who depend on it, several
states' water for vital human needs raises significant, though unresolved, human rights issues);
Amy Hardberger, Whose Job is it Anyway?: Governmental Obligations Created by the Human
Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT'L L. J. 533, 541-546 (2006) (discussing government to
government obligations in relation to the human right to water).
106. See Robert Jerome Glennon and Peter W. Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and
Why the Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 903,
907 (2002).
107. See, e.g., Frank Clifford, Troubled Waters, L. A. TIMES, May 25, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/25/local/me-newcolorado25; DANIEL LUECKE, ET AL., A
DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND WETLAND HABITAT IN THE COLORADO
RIVER DELTA 2, 7-8 (1999).
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recent agreements between the U.S. and Mexico reflect a new level of
cooperation between the countries. These agreements show promise
that diplomacy and cooperation between the countries might
successfully be deployed to address human rights concerns that
develop in the future as a result of declining water supply in the
Colorado River. The most important of these agreements, Minute 318
of the International Water and Boundary Commission, allows
Mexico, for the -first time, to store water in U.S. reservoirs for future
delivery to Mexico. 08The agreement was precipitated by last year's
devastating earthquake in northern Mexico, which destroyed water
delivery facilities in the Mexicali region of the delta, making it
impossible for Mexico to beneficially use its full share of Colorado
River water for a projected three years. Under Minute 318, a
maximum of 260,000 acre-feet of water will be held in Lake Mead for
delivery beginning in 2014 after Mexico's infrastructure is repaired.
In addition to benefiting Mexico by banking water for delivery when
it can be beneficially used, the agreement will help elevate the level
of water in Lake Mead, decreasing the risk that a shortage will occur
under the Interim Guidelines.
Minute 318 comes on the heels of another reflecting increased
cross-boundary cooperation that can address water shortage,
environmental decline, and water quality in Mexico. In June 2010,
Mexico and the U.S. reached agreement on a conceptual framework
for future discussions about cooperative measures, such as using U.S.
infrastructure to store water for use in Mexico and identifying water
for environmental purposes. 10 9 Environmentalists have advocated
using programs like ICS to ensure that the benefits of efficiency gains
or system augmentation flow to the Colorado River delta, and this
agreement holds the potential to realize those hopes.Also, in April
2010, the countries agreed to dedicate water to the Santa Clara
wetland in Mexico during a pilot run of the Yuma Desalting Plant. 110
This agreement will ensure that this important wetland will not be
deprived of inflow during the operation of the plant.
108. Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n, U.S.-Mex., Minute No. 318, Dec. 17, 2010
available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min_318.pdf.
109. Id. at Minute No. 317.
110. Id. at Minute No. 316.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Colorado River is surely one of the most utilized rivers on
the planet. We have manipulated it to accomplish many things,
including providing a basic water supply for millions of people in the
U.S. and Mexico and irrigating millions of acres of land to provide
food and fiber. The Colorado River's extensive infrastructure, both
physical and legal, has arisen in response to human needs but without
any particular attention to the notion of a human right to water. So,
too, have developed the deep problems, both human and ecological,
that now plague the system. With the recent emergence of the human
right to water in international law, the basic question is: What does
the human right to water do for the problems along one of the most
developed rivers in the richest nation on earth? Does it add anything
that might help frame the problems of the river system in a helpful
new light as we head toward new crises hastened by climate change?
As important as the human right to water may be in less
developed areas of the world, I remain ambivalent about its role in the
Colorado River system. On the positive side, it seems apparent that
the core concerns of the human right to water - basic access to clean
water for drinking and sanitation - have been fairly well served by the
Law of the River and the physical infrastructure it supports. The one
major exception is the fact that so much of Indian country is so poorly
served. But the recent Navajo water rights settlements, striking a new
direction in the settlement of reserved water rights claims, will go
some distance toward closing that gap.
On the less optimistic side are the increasingly critical and
stubbornly intractable ecological problems that attend a river system
so heavily manipulated for human uses. The Law of the Colorado
River, like western water law in general, developed to promote
utilitarian values, particularly the human use of water to support
economic activities such as agriculture, natural resources
development, energy generation and industry. Water that has been
deployed for human use has come at the expense of the natural
environment. Given the fact that scarcity, ecological values and uses
of water stand in opposition to human uses, ecological protection and
restoration demands a redeployment of water from human uses to the
environment. Because of its narrow focus on basic human needs, the
human right to water seems unlikely to provide a new tool for
addressing ecological problems in the Colorado River basin. Indeed,
because of the imperative power of its focus-basic human needs-
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there is some risk that it could create a further human demand for
water that will come at the expense of the environment. As the
human right to water gains force-politically or legally-it will be
important to see that its demands are met first from existing human
uses rather than from water essential for the ecological integrity of the
system. This will be no easy task for a legal system founded largely
on priority and the protection of prior uses.
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